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Abstract 
In this paper we study the relation between the distribution of income 
and the distribution of a given housing stock over under various allocation 
mechanisms. In order to study a pure situation the population consists of 
households which differ only in income. We analyze the effects of various 
government measures intended to change the relation between these 
distributions. 
We first study a system in which prices are the only allocation 
instrument and switch later on to more complicated allocation mechanisms in 
which part of the costs associated with housing are financed by tax 
payments and a rent subsidy is introduced. Finally we consider a system of 
income prices. 
The positive relationship between income and housing quality can only be 
altered when the rents are dependent on income because of a rent subsidy or 
income prices. However, even under such allocation mechanisms the positive 
relationship holds when housing is a luxury good. 
In order to judge the effects of the various allocation mechanisms we 
employ the theory of fairness as developed by Kolm, Varian and others. It 
is shown that the distribution of the housing stock under uniform prices, 
i.e. prices which are independent of income, is the only one that can be 
considered as incrementally fair. Allocation systems which use prices that 
are dependent on income do not have this property. 
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1 Introduction 
In many West European countries the government has taken a number of 
measures that influence the functioning of the housing market. The 
immediate purpose of this intervention is usually the improvement of market 
outcomes, in the sense that one tries to reach a more equitable 
distribution of housing costs and housing possibilities over the population 
of households. Although the number and intensity of policy measures 
referring to the housing market varies from country to country (government 
intervention seems to be most intense in Sweden and the Netherlands), their 
influence on the allocation of available dwellings over the population is 
everywhere regarded as significant. 
The main aspect of the perceived inequity concerns the discrepancy 
between perceived housing needs and housing possibilities. These housing 
needs should not be identified with housing demand in the sense that is 
given to this term in economics. 'Housing needs' usually refers to a 
concept of reasonable minimal requirements which the housing situation of 
households of a particular composition should fuifil. The concept is hard 
to define in a precise way and its actual content seems to vary with the 
welfare level of the society concerned as well as with the situation of the 
government budget. Notwithstanding the vagueness of the concept, the 
perceived housing needs play an important role in the determination of the 
housing policy in West European countries.1 
One of the main reasons for making housing needs, as distinguished from 
housing demand, an object for government concern seems to be the f act that 
demand is influenced by the income of the household concerned as well as by 
its preferences. The common-sense reasoning seems to be that households 
with the same composition but different incomes have equal needs for 
housing, but differ in the possibilities they have to realize this need. It 
is indeed difficult to deny that such reasoning has some appeal. 
Much of the political concern for the housing market has to do with the 
relation between a household's income and the dwelling it occupies, and 
with the possibilities to influence this relation. For this reason we will 
in this paper study the relation between the distribution of income and the 
allocation of the housing stock over the population under various 
allocation mechanisms. These allocation mechanisms all respect the freedom 
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of choice of individual households, but provide different incentives for 
actual behaviour. The question we seek to answer is whether significant 
changes in the relation between income and housing can be the result of 
such indirect 'guidance' of the housing market. 
We will use a highly stylized model in which a pópulation of households 
which differ only in the income they earn has to be distributed over a 
given, heterogeneous housing stock. Freedom of choice is respected and in 
equilibrium demand should be equal to supply for each available dweiling 
type. It will also be assumed that the government budget, as f ar as it 
concerns housing policy, is always balanced. It will be clear from this 
short description that the model cannot be viewed as a close representation 
of a real-world housing market. Instead, it is intended to give a clear 
representation of a pure case in which our problem can be analyzed. In the 
final section of the paper the relevance of this analysis will be discussed 
and extensions suggested. 
In the next section we will - as a prologue - shortly discuss the 
preoccupation of many politicians with the relation between income and 
housing from the economist's point of view. We then move on to a formal 
presentation of our model and discuss household behaviour, market demand 
and equilibrium. Then four different allocation mechanisms will be 
introduced and compared with respect to their effects on the distribution 
of the housing stock and the distribution of income-net-of-housing-costs. 
The paper is concluded with some remarks on the normative aspects of these 
mechanisms. 
2 Housing Policy and Housing Needs 
The purpose of social policy, including housing policy, is usually the 
reduction of social inequality. Social inequality has a number of aspects, 
of which inequality on the housing market is only one, but it is well-
known that there exist some general relationships between apparently 
different indicators of this phenomenon. For instance, well-educated people 
in general receive a relatively high income and live in a comfortable 
dwelling. The correlation between the relative position of households as 
measured by various indicators implies that society functions more or less 
as a filter with overall losers and winners. This can be interpreted in the 
following way : men, which are to viewed as equal in some fundamental 
sense, are allowed to become unequal by the way society functions. Although 
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the normative judgments that this process invokes differ, it is no 
exaggeration to say that many people regard this as unjust.2 As a 
consequence there is broad support for government measures that are 
intended to reduce the resulting inequality to some extent. This aspiration 
is especially present among social-democrats, but - although usually to a 
smaller extent - by other political denominations as well. 
The particular aspect of social inequality that can be observed on the 
housing market has been described by Priemus, an authoritative investigator 
of the Dutch housing market and also a member of the Dutch labour party, as 
the widely observable 
'phenomenon that strong participants (in the housing market) are 
in general able to occupy a dweiling which is placed high in the 
hierarchy of dweiling types, while weaker participants have to be 
satisfied with dweiling types which are placed low in this 
hierarchy' [Priemus, 1983, p.278]. 
Although the strength of a participant's position on the housing market 
mentioned here is certainly not identical with its income position, the 
interrelatedness of the various aspects of social inequality makes it, 
nevertheless, a reasonable indicator. The relationship can therefore be 
formulated in pregnant form (see Priemus [1978], [1983]) as the 'iron law 
of the housing market' : 
'occupiers with the highest incomes live in the best dwellings, 
those with the lowest incomes in the worst dwellings' [Priemus, 
1983, p.278]. 
This 'iron law' will be of major concern in the remainder of this paper. 
Government measures relating to the housing market are usually intended to 
mitigate this relation. The effects of such measures may be two-fold : the 
distribution of income-net-of-housing-costs may become more equal (as 
compared to market allocation) as a result of the special measures taken to 
help the poor and the distribution of the dweiling types over the 
households may become more equitable. Moreover, the interrelatedness of the 
various aspects of social inequality gives some hope that additional 
positive effects may occur as well. 
For an economist the empirical observation of the 'iron law' may invoke 
the conclusion that housing is clearly a non-inferior good (as is confirmed 
by all available empirical evidence) and that - for this reason 
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(relatively) rich households consume more of it than (relatively) poor 
ones. This does not in itself provide any more reason for government 
intervention than does the fact that there is e.g., a positive correlation 
between income and holiday expenditures. If one does not like the 
inequality in the allocation on the housing market one should change the 
cause of this particular allocation, viz. the unequal income distribution. 
Measures that refer to the housing market in particular (e.g. rent 
subsidies) should on the basis of conventional micro-economie theory be 
expected to be less efficiënt than measures that change the income 
distribution directly by means of lump-sum transfers. Many economists would 
therefore be inclined to advice the government to introducé (a more severe 
form of) income policy and to abstain from housing policy. 
Although this opinion is attractive, and indeed irrefutable, from the 
purely theoretical point of view which presumes a competetive world with 
Pareto-optimal outcomes and an initial distribution of resources that can 
be changed ad valorum, its practical relevance may be doubted.3 The 
reduction of actual income inequality is not an easy task and will probably 
have (large) negative side-effects. In the actual world of second best 
choices it may therefore be a good policy on the one hand to maintain some 
income inequality, while on the other to mitigate some of its (perceived) 
negative consequences. One of these ill-preferred effects is that for 
households with the lowest incomes the sufficiënt provision of some basic 
needs, such as housing, is not guaranteed by the market. The normative 
question, then, is whether social welfare can be increased by government 
interference in the housing market. 
The importance of this question should not be obscured by the fact that 
we do not have an unambiguous and operational concept of social welfare. 
The Pareto-criterion is obviously unsatisfactory in questions of 
distributive justice. Utilitarianism also has its well-known drawbacks. The 
best alternative seems to be the concept of fairness, as developed by Kolm 
[1972], Varian [1974] and others. It considers the distribution of a set of 
commodities over a population as 'fair' if none of the participants envies 
the share any other participant gets (i.e. if he regards his own share as 
at least as good as any other). We will use this theory for the comparison 
of the effects of the various allocation mechanisms. 
An alternative way of looking at the effects of the various possible 
measures influencing the housing market takes the viewpoint that 
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politicians are concerned with the number of votes. The various possible 
measures that can be taken are probably all beneficial to sorae and 
disadvantageous to others. The attractivenes of possible measures is 
therefore dependent on the distribution of the costs and benefits 
associated with it over the population. This point of view might facilitate 
the study of actual policy measures taken in various countries. 
It may be concluded from the foregoing that there is reason - both from 
the normative and the positive point of view - to study the relation 
between income and housing. In this paper we will try to contribute to such 
analysis. We will start in the next section with a formal presentation of 
our frame of analysis. Subsequent sections are devoted to an analysis of 
the relation between the various possible allocation mechanisms and the 
resulting allocation on the housing market. In the final section we return 
to the normative aspects of the problem under consideration. 
3 The Allocation Problem 
Throughout this paper we will be concerned with the question of how to 
distribute a given stock of heterogeneous dwellings over a given population 
of b households, which differ only in income. Income will be regarded as a 
continuous variable and the income distribution will be described by a 
continuous density function f(y) which is assumed to have positive support 
on some interval [y . , y 1, y >y . >0, and is zero elsewhere. The set 
•'mm ^max •'max •'mm 
of households earning an income y is always assumed to be of measure 0. It 
will be assumed that there is a finite number, N, of dwelling types and we 
will refer to the total number of dwellings of type n as S . These numbers 
are exogenously determined and we will assume the following : 
Assumption 1 
N 
l s n = b. (i) 
n=l 
This assumption says that the market is balanced, i.e. total demand is 
exactly equal to total supply. In the present context, where we are not 
concerned with dynamics and mobility, it is hard to see why there should be 
more dwellings than households to occupy them. 
We use the general assumption that prices are determined by allocation 
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variables w and by the income of the household : 
p = p (w , y), (2.) 
n rn n' J ' ' 
n=l,..,N. 
The function p is increasing in u> for all income levels. It should be 
n ° n 
interpreted as the price a household with income y has to pay for a 
dwelling of type n. This implies that it is no longer meaningful to speak 
of the price of a particular type of dwelling. A price equilibrium is 
therefore no longer characterized by a set of values, but by a set of 
functions, viz. the p 's. Since it is, nevertheless, convenient to have the 
rn 
possibility to characterize a price equilibrium by a set of values, we have 
introduced the variables w , which will be referred to as allocation 
n 
variables. In later sections of the paper particular interpretations of the 
allocation variables will be given. 
We will assume throughout that, for each income y, p becomes infinitely 
large if w increases without an upper bound and becomes infinitely small 
(negative) if w decreases without a lower bound. 
° n 
Sometimes it will be convenient to regard the price p as consisting of 
two parts : the rent, to be denoted as r , and taxes or subsidies 
associated with housing, to be denoted as q (note that the latter variable 
is independent of the dwelling type n). Only the rental part of the price 
p depends on w , and we have : 
n n 
Pn(wn' y ) = rn(wn' y ) + q(y)' (3) 
n=l,...,N. 
The determination of the tax q(y) will be discussed later on. Note that we 
do not restrict the rents or taxes to be nonnegative. When they are 
negative, they can be interpreted as monetary compensations for a 
relatively low dwelling quality or as subsidies. Examples will be 
encountered in later sections. 
Households are assumed to be utility maximizers and choose the dwelling 
type which offers them the highest level of utility. They will always 
choose one type of dwelling (not two or more, or zero). The total number of 
households that choose a dwelling of type n will be referred to as the 
demand D . A first condition which any equilibrium allocation to be 
considered here has to fuifil is that it should be market-like, i.e. demand 
should be equal to supply for all types of dwellings : 
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D = S , (4) 
n n 
n=l...N. 
The stock of dwellings is assumed to be completely owned by the 
government, which also sets the rules for its distribution over the 
households. The costs of maintenance of the housing stock have to be paid 
by the government and an essential second condition which any allocation 
mechanism to be considered here should satisfy is that the revenues of the 
housing stock are sufficiënt to pay these costs. The cost of maintenance of 
a dweiling of type n will be denoted as c . They do not need to be equal to 
the rent r that has to be paid for this dwelling. What is always required, 
however, is that the sum of the revenues equals the sum of the costs. This 
implies : 
N N 
l ƒ P n<v y).*n(w, y).f(y).b.dy - I ^ .s n, (5) 
n=l y n=l 
where 5 is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if a household 
demands a dwelling of type n and is equal to zero otherwise, and u> is the 
vector of allocation variables. The determination of the 5 's will be 
n 
discussed in the next section. 
Equation (5) states that the costs of maintenance of the housing stock 
are completely paid in each period. The budget of the government is 
therefore always assumed to be balanced, as far as it concerns housing 
expenditures. This is our second equilibrium condition. 
The foregoing discussion motivates the following : 
Definition An equilibrium is a vector of allocation variables w such 
that : 
a) demand equals supply for all dwelling types 1...N, 
b) the government budget is balanced. 
For later reference we introducé the following notational conventions : 
the left-hand-side (lhs) of equation (5) will sometimes be denoted briefly 
as P : 
N 
P - l ƒ p n ( » n . y ) - « n ( « . y ) . f ( y ) . b . d y > (6) 
n=l y 
the r i g h t - h a n d - s i d e ( rhs ) as C : 
N 
c = y c .s . u
. n n 
n=l 
The revenues P consist of two parts, as becomes clear by substitution of 
(3) into (6) : 
N 
P - l ƒ rn(y, Wn).5n(y, o)).f(y).b.dy + (8) 
n=l y 
+ ƒ q(y).f(y).b.dy. 
y 
The first term on the rhs of this equation will sometimes be denoted as R : 
N 
R = E ƒ rn(y, «n).fin(y, «).f(y).b.dy, (9) 
n=l y 
the second term as Q : 
Q - ƒ q(y).f(y).b.dy. (10) 
y 
4 Household Behaviour and the Existence of Equilibrium 
It has already been mentioned in the preceding section that we will 
consider a population of utility-maximizing households which is homogeneous 
except for one characteristic : income. Since this is the purest situation 
one can imagine in which our problem occurs it is a convenient starting 
point for the present analysis. 
The utility that is experienced by a household is a function of the 
vector characteristics d of the dweiling it occupies and of the vector x of 
the quantities of other commodities which it consumes : 
u = u(d, x). (11) 
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We will distinguish a finite number, N, of dweiling types and the vector d 
is therefore restricted to take on only N values, each corresponding with 
the characteristics of one available dwelling type. 
In previous sections we have spoken of best and worst dwellings, without 
making explicit how the appropriate ranking of the dweiling types could be 
determined. The formulation of the utility function in (11) does not assure 
that all households rank all dwellings in the same way. This is caused by 
the fact that the availability of other consumption goods may influence the 
ranking of the dweiling types. For instance, it may happen that a household 
that possesses a car has other preferences about the location of the 
dwelling it occupies than a household that does not. 
In order to rule out this possibility and be able to define unambiguously 
a hierarchy of dwelling types, it is necessary to assume that the 
preferences of the households are weakly separable in the dwelling 
characteristics, i.e. that the utility function can be written as : 
u(d, x) = u'(w(d), x). (12) 
The function u should be increasing in w(d). The latter function can be 
interpreted as a partial utility function for dwelling characteristics. 
We summarize this as : 
Assumption 2 The preferences of the households are weakly separable in the 
dwelling characteristics. 
Assumption 2 allows us to rank the dwellings on the basis of their 
partial Utilities. Dwellings of type 1 are the most desirable, dwellings of 
type N least desirable. 
For simplicity of notation we will use w as an abbreviation of w(d ) 
c J
 n n 
throughout the remainder of the paper. 
In order to determine the household's demand for housing the utility 
function has to be maximized subject to the budget constraint. This 
constraint can be written as : 
10 
N 
l s -vA* y) + *-x * y. d3) 
.. n * n n 
n=l 
n=l,...,N, 
where the 5 ' s are dummy variables which take on the value 1 when a 
dweiling of type n is chosen and are equal to zero otherwise, and n denotes 
the prices of the other commodities. It will be assumed throughout that 
preferences are such that only one type of dweiling will be chosen.4 
On the basis of the foregoing we cannot be sure that the will be 
dwellings for which the budget constraint is satisfied. For instance, one 
can imagine the situation in which al prices p exceed y for some income 
levels. It is however possible to exclude such situations when we make the 
following assumption : 
Assumption 3 
N 
Ie .S < y . .b. (14) 
*% n n -'mm 
n=l 
This assumption says that the average costs of housing do not exceed the 
minimum income level y . . The budget constraint of the government 
guarantees that there must be at least one dweiling type for which p < 
y . , which is sufficiënt to ensure that every household can choose a 
m m 
dwelling type without violating his budget constraint. 
The maximum level of utility that can be obtained when 6 is restricted 
J
 n 
to take on the value 1 will be denoted as v and is a function of the 
n 
partial utility of housing, of income minus the rent of the dwelling and of 
the prices of other consumption goods : 
Vn = V^Wn' y"Pn' "^  ' ^15^ 
n=l...N. 
The variable v is the indirect utility associated with the occupation of a 
dwelling of type n. Since the prices n are the same for all households and 
we are, in the present paper, not concerned with the consequences of 
changes in them, they will usually be suppressed. We make the following 
assumption5 : 
Assumption 4 The functions v are continuously increasing in w and y-p . 
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It follows from this assumption that it is possible to substitute (small) 
changes in income for (small) changes in housing quality and vice versa. In 
what follows, we will need a stronger, global, notion of this 
substitutability. For this reason we formulate : 
Assumption 5 For all possible values of y, w., w. and p. there exists a p. 
such that : 
< v(w. , y-p.), whenever p.<p. 
3 3 3 3 
- v(w , y-p.) , (16) 
> v(w., y-p.), whenever p.>p. 
3 3 3 3 
v(wi, y-pt) < 
This assumption states that differences between the qualities of two 
dweiling types can always be compensated by differences in income-net-
of-housing-costs. Note that we do not exclude negative prices. 
The dweiling type that will be demanded by the household is the one that 
gives the highest level of utility v : 
f 1 if v > v , for all n' e {1...N) 
5 n = ] n n (17) 
[ 0 otherwise 
This implies that we will have £ 8 =1, except for those cases in which the 
maximum value of v is reached for two or more dwelling types. The actual 
value of 5 depends on the income of the household concerned, on the 
partial Utilities and prices of all available dwelling types and on the 
prices of all other consumption goods. This means that we have : 
5n = 5n^y' P' Wl'"""'WN' "^ ' ^18^ 
n=l N. 
Since dwelling characteristics are given, as are the prices of other 
consumption goods, these arguments can be suppressed. Variation in demand 
among households thus depends in fact only on variations in income and 
prices. Af ter substitution of (2) we can therefore write 8 = 8 (y, w) r
 n n 
instead of the more cumbersome expression in (18), as has already been done 
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in the previous section. 
In order to derive an expression for the total demand D for dwellings of 
type n we have to know something about the income distribution. We use the 
following definition : 
00 
D
n
 = h
--J sn(y' " ) - f (y ) - d y . (19> 
n=l,...,N. 
If the set of incomes for which Y S exceeds 1 is of measure zero, as will 
^n n 
usually be the case,6 we have : 
N 
l D = b. (20) 
n-1 
On the basis of the assumptions that have been made it is possible to 
demonstrate existence of an unique equilibrium in the present model if the 
demand functions are continuous : 
Proposition 1 If assumptions 1...5 are satisfied and the market demand 
functions are continuous in the allocation variables, there exists an 
unique equilibrium. 
The proof of this proposition has been relegated to the appendix. It 
should be observed that the proposition does not refer to one specific 
allocation procedure. In the next four sections we will introducé and 
discuss four different allocation mechanisms in the model. It is shown in 
the appendix that the proposition is relevant to all these mechanisms. It 
is also shown there that, under special circumstances, the condition of 
continuity can be violated. 
Section 5 is devoted to a discussion of the situation in which an 
equilibrium has to be reached by uniform prices, i.e. prices which are 
independent of income. In section 6 we introducé the possibility to finance 
housing costs (partly or completely) by means of a tax. Rent-subsidies are 
incorporated in section 7. Finally, section 8 is devoted to a discussion of 
income prices as a means to equilibrate the market. The situation of 
uniform prices can be identified more or less with allocation by means of 
13 
the market mechanism. The other three allocation mechanisms depend on 
intervention by the government. 
5 The validity of the 'iron law' 
In the present and next sections we will study the conventional 
allocation system in which there are uniform prices, i.e. price which are 
equal for all households, for all available types of dwellings. We start in 
this section with an examination of the conditions under which the iron law 
is valid. An assumption that can be interpreted as the exclusion of 
inferiority of housing turns out to be a sufficiënt condition for this to 
be the case. We continue in the next section with a closer examination of 
the allocation at uniform prices and its normative characteristics. 
We start with the simple observation that, under uniform prices, the 
price of a dwelling type is an increasing function of its partial utility. 
To see this it suffices to observe that the availability of a dwelling type 
which has a higher quality and is less expensive than some other dwelling 
type implies that demand for the latter type will be zero. 
It is be tempting to go one step further and conjecture that the there is 
also a correlation between the price paid for a dwelling and the income 
level. This would establish the 'iron law', referred to above, as a 
theorem. However, it turns out that we need an additional assumption before 
we will be able to make this second inference. Even in the case where 
preferences are (weakly) separable in housing characteristics, as was 
assumed above, the strong relationship between income and housing demand 
that is implied by the 'iron law' does not necessarily exist. The reason is 
that an increase in income does not automatically imply a greater 
willingness to pay for the same increase in dwelling quality. 
The situation is illustrated by the three diagrams on the next page. All 
three figures have the partial utility of housing w, and income-net-of-
housing-costs on their axes. Three indifference curves are drawn and four 
combinations (w, y-p) are shown. Two of these refer to a low income level, 
yn , two to a medium income level, y„, and two to a high income level, y_. 
There are two dwelling types with partial Utilities w. and w„ and prices p.. 
and p„ respectively. The price of dwelling 1, which has the higher partial 
utility, is higher than that of 2, while the household with the medium 
14 
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\ \ 
V 
Figure 1 Allocation at uniform prices : housing is non-inferior. 
w 
Figure 2 Allocation at uniform prices : housing is inferior. 
\ \ 
\ ^ K 
Figure 3 Allocation at uniform prices : the boundary case. 
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income is indifferent between both. In figure 2 the reverse situation is 
pictured : the household with the low income prefers the expensive 
dwelling, the household with the high income the cheap dweiling, while the 
household with the medium income is again indifferent. Figure 3 shows the 
boundary case in which all households are indifferent. 
The 'iron law' is only valid in the situation pictured in figure 1. The 
figures suggest that the changes that occur in the curvature of the 
indifference lines when income rises play a crucial role. In figure 1 the 
slope of these curves becomes steeper as income rises, in figure 2 the 
reverse is the case and in figure 3 the slope remains the same. The slope 
of the indifference curve is given by the following formula : 
dw/d(y-p) 
3v 3v 
3(y-p) 3w' 
v=v 
/ -SZ- (21) 
We may denote the slope of the indifference curve through a point (w, y-p) 
as a function s, s=s(w, y-p). It seems to be required, for the iron law to 
hold, that this slope becomes more negative as y increases.7 This 
conjecture is confirmed by : 
Proposition 2 The 'iron law' is valid if 3s/3y > O.8 
Proof. Suppose that 3s/3y < 0, but that there, nevertheless, is a pair of 
households (i,j), of which the one with the highest income occupies the 
dwelling that is placed lowest in the hierarchy. Since prices are not 
income-dependent this means that the same difference w -w„ in w can for the 
lower income be traded off by the income difference p..-p_, while this is 
impossible for the higher income. This gives a contradiction with the 
condition of the proposition. D 
We conclude from proposition 2 that the condition on the slope of the 
indifference curves implies that households with high incomes will spend 
more on housing than households with low incomes. It can therefore be 
interpreted as a statement of the non-inferiority of housing.9 Since this 
characteristic is without exception found in empirical research, we will 
adopt it as an additional assumption : 
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Assumption 6 Housing is a not inferior, i.e. the utility function is such 
that : 
Ss/3y > 0 (22) 
The 'invisible hand' behind the allocation mechanism studied here is the 
trade-off between additional disposable income (i.e. income net of housing 
costs) and a better dweiling (i.e. a dweiling type which is placed higher 
in the hierarchy). Low income households choose in favour of more 
disposable income, while high income households are ready to pay the higher 
price. 
The equilibrium under uniform prices can be studied in detail when use is 
made of the known validity of the 'iron law' which enables us to formulate 
the following equations, which must be valid in equilibrium : 
00 
ƒ f(y).dy = S1, (23a) 
*1 
ƒ n _ 1 f(y).dy = Sn, (23b) 
n=l ,N-1, 
ƒ iN_i f(y).dy = S„. (23c) -
Y -1 
0 N 
In these equations the values y are the lower bounds of the segments of 
the income distribution that are relevent for the demand for dwellings of 
type n. These equations therefore allow us to determine these critical 
income levels recursively. 
At a particular income level y we should have : 
v(w , y -p ) = v(w . , y -p ..) , (24) 
n' -'n *n' n+1' Jn ln+l/ ' 
n=l, . ... ,N-2. 
where the superscript 1 refers to the equilibrium under uniform prices. 
These equations, which can be regarded as equilibrium conditions, allow us 
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to derive a relationship between the equilibrium prices p1 and p1 This 
relationship is conditional upon the value of y . It will be denoted as 
follows : 
P1 - g (P1 ,) (25) 
*n &n *n+l' v ' 
n-1 N-l, 
where g is an increasing function. 
The significance of the equations (25) is that they enable us to 
determine the equilibrium prices recursively as functions of p . The total 
revenues P of the housing stock can now be computed as : 
N y 
* - E gn(p^>- S 5n(y. ?).fn(y).tfy, (26) 
n=l y 
•'n 
n-l,...,N, 
where y_ should be identified with <» and y»r=0 ! g denotes 
g (g - (...g .(p*).)). The total revenues should be equal to the total 
costs, given in (8). Since the revenues are an increasing function of p* 
it is easy to find the price p* that at which the budget is balanced. We 
are therefore able to compute the equilibrium prices in the case of equal 
sharing. It may be noted that it makes no sense to divide these prices in a 
part that is identified with rent and another part that is identified with 
a subsidy or tax. The subsidy or tax can be fixed at an arbitrary value q 
and the equilibrium rent r as the difference between the equilibrium price 
p and q. 
n 
If assumption 5 is valid, the only possible way to avoid the ' iron law' 
is the introduction of prices which are dependent on income. In subsequent 
sections we will examine several ways to introducé this dependency. For 
later reference we. will denote the equilibrium variables under allocation 
with uniform prices by means of a superscript 1. We have : p1=w1=r1 for all 
n. 
6 Financing housing by means of taxation 
It has already been mentioned in the first two sections of the paper that 
many politicians regard the market allocation as unjust. They feel that the 
allocation of the housing stock, as well as of other commodities, can be 
18 
improved if the government takes measures that influence this allocation. 
For the moment, we will make no attempt to analyze this point of view, but 
simply note that such measures have been taken in many countries all over 
the world. We are interes ted in the effects of such measures on the 
allocation and will study these them in the present and subsequent sections 
of the paper. We turn to normative questions in the final section. 
Let us, first, adopt the view that housing is a public good, whose costs 
and benefits have to be distributed over the population in some fair way. 
It is no longer required that the sum of the rents that have been paid are 
sufficiënt to cover the costs associated with housing. Instead, we will now 
allow for the possibility that a part of the these costs will be financed 
out of taxes. The amount of tax that is used to finance housing that will 
be paid by a household with income y will be denoted as q, and is dependent 
on household income y and a parameter a : 
q=q(y, «). (27) 
The parameter a, which may be vector-valued, governs the value of the tax 
for the various income levels. It will be assumed that the tax is always 
nonnegative, that it is a non-decreasing function of income, and that the 
marginal rate of taxation is less than 1. 
The value of the parameter a determines the total revenues Q from 
tax-paying that will be used to finance housing costs. It may happen that 
different configurations of a give the same total revenues. In that case 
the value of a that is considered to be the most fair one may be chosen. 
The feasibility of the procedure outlined above is investigated in the 
appendix. It is shown there that for any given value of a there exist 
equilibrium rents, which will be referred to as r2, n=l...N, at which the 
government budget is exactly balanced. These rents are equal to the 
allocation variables w2, but are different from the variables p2. We will 
n n 
discuss this equilibrium in the remainder of the present section. 
The main similarity between the allocation at uniform prices and the one 
considered here is that the distribution of the households over the housing 
stock is the same. The allocation system considered in the present section 
can be considered as a two-stage procedure. In the first stage all 
households have to pay a tax, which is dependent on their income, while in 
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the second stage the housing stock is allocated by means of uniform prices. 
The effect of the tax is that the income distribution has changed and that 
the amount of rent revenues needed to balance the governmeht budget is now 
equal to C-Q instead of C. The allocation of the housing stock itself 
remains unchanged. A household that occupied a dweiling of type n under an 
allocation system with uniform prices will still occupy such a dweiling 
after the introduction of tax-financing. The 'iron law' will therefore 
still be valid. 
It follows immediately that equations (25) are still valid in the present 
context. However, instead of equation (26) we will now have the following 
equations : 
v(w , y -r -q(y , a)) •= v(w . , y -r ,-q(y , a)), (28) 
n'
 J
n n
 HKJ
n' " v n+1' Jn n+1 HKJn' ' " v ' 
n-1 N-2. 
which can be used to determine recursive equations for the equilibrium 
rents r2 for any given way of tax levying. The equations are of course 
analogous (but not identical) to (24). 
Let us now examine the question whether the prices p in the present 
situation can be the same as under uniform pricing. The answer is that this 
will be impossible as soon as the tax q shows some variation with income, 
i.e. if q(y ,a) exceeds q(y
 1 ,a) for some n=l...N-2, where y is the 
critical income level for dwellings of type n introduced in the previous 
section. As soon as this variation exists the equations (30) can no longer 
be all identical to (26) . On the other hand, it is obvious that the same 
equilibrium as under uniform prices can be reached when the tax is the same 
at all income levels. It can therefore be concluded that the equilibrium 
prices p1 will be different from p2 for at least some ne{l...N} if and only 
n n 
if the tax q does vary with income. 
If prices are not the same in both equilibria, some must be Lower and 
others higher, since the net amount of money raised by the tax and the 
rents must in both situations be equal. It would probably be judged to be 
desirable if for the lower incomes the price of housing has decreased. We 
will show that this will indeed be the case. 
Assume that in the equilibrium with a housing tax p£(yM -i )>pi(vvr i ) . i-e. 
at the critical income level at which the switch from dwellings of type N 
to dwellings of type N-1 occurs, the dwellings of type N have become more 
expensive. Since the partial Utilities v are increasing in income-net-of-
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housing-costs, it must be concluded that, because of the equality sign in 
(29), p^ ,(y ) also exceeds p* o(yM 5 ) - Since q is non-decreasing in 
income, we must conclude that p 2 .. (y ,.) will also be greater than 
pA -1 (yN o)- Now we can repeat the same reasoning until we find that p 2 (y..) 
> p*(y ). This gives a contradiction with the condition that the budget of 
the government will be balanced in both equilibria. We must therefore 
conclude that a housing tax that is non-decreasing in income leads to a 
lower price for the worst type of dwelling. Analogously it follows that the 
price for the best types of dweiling increases. (It should be observed that 
the discussion above amounts to the 'full' price, viz. the sum of the rent 
and the housing tax. We cannot exclude the situation in which the rents, 
even for the highest preferred types of dwellings will be lower after the 
introduction of the housing tax.) This can be summarized as follows : 
Pf > V[ (29a) 
P N > P N (29b) 
With respect to the differences in housing prices it can be observed from 
assumption 5 that a lower income gives rise to a smaller willingness to pay 
for a given improvement in dweiling quality. The introduction of the tax 
implies that the incomes which are relevant for the determination of the 
rents, viz. the incomes-net-of-taxes have all decreased. This implies that 
the differences between the rents of all types of dwellings will decrease, 
i .e. : 
p 1-? 1, > p2-p2, (30) 
n n' rn rn' 
n, n' =1. . . N, n' >n. 
This implies a tendency towards greater equality in rents, as a consequnece 
of the introduction of the housing tax. 
7 Tax-Financing and Rent Subsidies 
In the present section we introducé a rent subsidy which can be regarded 
as a simplified version of the actual system of rent subsidies used in the 
Netherlands. The government subsidizes rent expenditures of households when 
they exceed a predetermined share of their budget. This implies that the 
rents r now also become income-dependent. In principle there is a uniform 
n 
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Figure 4 The Share of Rent in Total Income. 
rent w for each type of dweiling, but the actual rent may differ 
r (y) = w - max {0, o .(w -o y) 
n n l'
v
 n 2" 
n=l...,N. 
The revenues from rent will in this case be equal to : 
It will be assumed throughout that 0 < a^,a. < 1. 
(31) 
N 
R
= 1 I [Pn " max{0, a1.(pn-a2.y)}].fn(y).dy, 
n=l y 
(32) 
which will, of course, never exceed the revenues associated with the same 
rents without subsidies. This implies that the introduction of a rent 
subsidy forces the government to increase the rents or the taxes (or both). 
It will be assumed throughout that the subsidy is financed purely from 
higher taxes. 
The rent subsidy is intended to help the poor. It will only be effective 
in this respect, however, if households with a low income spend a larger 
share of their budget on housing than households with a high income,10 i.e. 
when housing is a normal good and not a luxury good. This will be assumed 
to be the case throughout this section. 
The effects of the introduction of the rent subsidy are complex. The 
first consequence is, of course, that households who spend more than the 
predetermined share of income on housing receive a subsidy. One may wonder 
whether these households are always the poorest ones. In order to get a 
first impression of the answer, let us return to the situation analyzed in 
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Figure 5 Effects of a Rent Subsidy. 
the previous section. In the equilibrium situation the iron law is valid 
and the households with the lowest incomes live in the cheapest dwellings. 
The expenditures on rent will increase with income. However, the share of 
the rent in total income does not necessarily increase. This share will 
first decrease, until a switch is made to a better, and therefore more 
expensive, type of dwelling and will then again decrease. The picture is 
illustrated in figure 4. It is shown there that it may happen that also 
relatively rich households will be subsidized, even though the share of the 
rent in total income is in general declining, while there may also be some 
relatively poor households who will not receive a rent subsidy. 
It should be noticed, however, that the introduction of a rent subsidy 
will change the choice behaviour of the households. They become inclined to 
switch to a dwelling of a higher quality at a lower income level, because 
the rent subsidy enables them to bear the burden of the higher costs 
earlier. This implies that the critical income levels will change. When the 
subsidies have a marginal effect only, i.e. when switches in the demand of 
households from type n+1 to type n only, households with an income just 
below a critical income level y will now also demand a dwelling of type n. 
It must therefore be expected that - at the initial equilibrium prices -
some or all critical income levels y , n=l...N-l decrease. Since this is 
clearly incompatible with equilibrium, there must be a counteracting 
relative increase in the prices of the dwelling types for which demand 
shows a net increase and a relative decrease in the prices of the dwelling 
types for which demand shows a net decrease. Although the effects cannot be 
determined in precise terms, it may be said that there will be a decrease 
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in the price of at least one dwelling type n and and increase in the price 
of at least one dwelling type n' , n'<n, while the prices of the dwelling 
types n'' inbetween these two may either increase or decrease. 
However, we cannot be sure that the effects of the introduction of a rent 
subsidy are marginal only. What can be said is that the ultimate effect of 
the subsidy on the allocation of the households over the housing stock will 
be nil, unless the 'iron law' is violated. Under the present allocation 
mechanism this is possible. The reason is that the subsidy introduces 
differences in the prices that various households have to pay. The 
introduction of the rent subsidy changes the additional amount of money 
that has to be paid for a given increase in quality. It may therefore 
happen that at income level y', where no housing subsidy will be received, 
a household prefers the cheaper dwelling of type n to the more expensive 
one of type n', while at the lower income y'' the reverse is the case. The 
situation is illustrated in figure 5. The indifference curves in this 
figure are the same as those drawn in figure 1. However, in figure 5 
dwellings of type 2 are subsidized to such an extent that the household 
with the low income prefers the high quality, even though the household 
with the medium income chooses in favour of the lower rent. As a 
consequence of the change in demand the price of the high- quality dwelling 
will increase and that of the low quality dwelling decrease and one can 
imagine that in the new equilibrium the household with the medium-income 
will now choose the low-quality dwelling, while both the low and the 
high-income households prefer the high-quality dwelling. whether or not the 
'iron law' will become violated as a consequence of the introduction of the 
rent subsidy depends on the preferences of the households and on the 
parameters CT.. and CT„ . 
In order to analyze the possible violation of the iron law, observe that 
the rent subsidy reduces the rent difference between two types of dwellings 
n and n' for which subsidy can be obtained from w -w , to a,.(w -w , ) . As 
J
 n n' 1 n n' 
long as income does not change too much, and for both dwelling types a 
subsidy can be obtained, the rent difference remains the same. Rent 
differences between dwelling types that are not subsidized will of course 
also remain the same. What changes, however, is the difference between 
rents of dwelling types which are subsidized and dwelling types which are 
not subsidized. The subsidized dwelling types all become more expensive, 
while the others keep the same rent. When large changes in income occur, 
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some dwelling types for which originally a subsidy could be obtained will 
now take a share of income which is less than a and will no longer be 
subsidized. 
In the equilibrium under the present allocation mechanism it is always 
possibie to distinguish a finite number (possibly zero, but this is an 
uninteresting case) of income intervals for which a rent subsidy is 
received. Since the rent differences between the subsidized dwellings on 
each interval are the same, it may be concluded that on each such interval 
the ' iron law' will be valid. That is, if there occurs a shift from one 
susidized dwelling type to another the type that is chosen at the highest 
income levels is the most expensive and has the highest quality. The same 
is of course true for the intervals of incomes at which no subsidy is 
obtained. 
Violation of the 'iron law' is therefore only possibie at incomes where 
subsidized and non-subsidized intervals touch each other. At such points 
demand may shift from a dwelling of type n to one of type n', with n'>n. As 
a typical pattern one would of course expect that the poor will all receive 
an income subsidy, while the rich will not. It should be noted, however, 
that this pattern is not automatically implied by our model. 
Let us first analyze what is necessary for a backslide to occur. The 
increase in the price difference between a subsidized and a non-subsidized 
dwelling equals o o„.(Ay). The indifference curves become less steep when 
income rises, which implies that the household becomes willing to pay more 
for the same increase in quality. For a backslide to occur, it is therefore 
necessary that the flattening of the indifference curves is insufficiënt to 
compensate for the increased price difference. A backslide is therefore 
only possibie when 3s/3y is smaller than o^.o„. Note that this analysis 
implies that a backslide will never occur when 3s/dy > 1, i.e. when housing 
is a luxury good. 
Let us now see what is necessary for a reswitching from no subsidy to 
subsidy to occur. The increase in the price difference, again, equals 
a .er Ay. The flattening of the indifference curves should now be 
sufficiënt to compensate for the increased price difference. In order to 
exclude reswitching we should therefore assume 8s/dy to be larger than 
a1.c_. It follows also that no reswitching occurs whenever 8s/dy > 1, which 
implies that housing is a luxury commodity. We must therefore conclude that 
the introduction of a rent subsidy will always favour the rich households 
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when housing is a luxury good. 
The typical pattern one expects is, of course, that that in which only 
poor households are subsidized. In order to study a special case in which 
such a pattern can occur, we make the following assumption : 
Assumption 7 
8s/dy = c (33) 
where c is a positive constant. 
When c is smaller than 1, housing is a normal good. When c > o..o~ there 
can be no backslide, only reswitching. When c = a1.a„ the demand functions 
are not continuous, and an equilibrium may not exist. The most relevant 
case occurs when c < a^ -o„. In that case there may be a backslide, although 
this is not necessarily the case. The quality of the dweiling occupied by 
households still shows a tendency to rise with the income level, but there 
is one possible discontinuity in this relationship. 
A final effect of the introduction of the housing subsidy that has to be 
noticed is that the housing tax must be increased in order to finance the 
subsidy. This will probably done in such a way that the rich households 
experience a heavier tax increase than the poor ones. The result will be a 
mitigation of the differences between the rents of the dweiling types and 
this counteracts the price increase for high quality dwellings which should 
be expected as a consequence of the introduction of rent subsidy. It will 
therefore compensate these households to some extent for this price 
increase. 
8 Income Prices 
The final allocation mechanism we want to consider makes use of income 
prices. In this situation the prices p are assumed to be set as a fraction 
of household income : 
p n (y ) - w n - y (34> 
n-l,...,N. 
For the iron law to be valid under this allocation mechanism, it is 
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necessary that the trade-off between a given increase in dweiling quality 
and a given additional share of income to be spent on housing should change 
in favour of the former when income rises. It will be clear that this 
requires a stronger condition on the slope of the indifference curves than 
that embodied in assumption 5. 
Let us consider the situation in which a household can choose between a 
dweiling of type n and one of type n' . The associated change in dwelling 
quality is w -w ,, w >w ,, the associated change in income (w -u> ,).y. If 
n n' n n' ö n n'
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the more expensive dwelling will be chosen at the higher income and the 
cheaper one at the lower income the slope of the indifference curves should 
flatten at a rate ds/dy > 1. This implies that housing should be a luxury 
good, in order to ensure that the iron law will still be valid. 
It will be convenient to rely again on assumption 7. If c < 1 the iron 
law will be exactly reversed. The willingness to pay for a given increase 
in dwelling quality rises, but this rise is not sufficiënt to compensate 
for the associated rise in the price. The implication is that there will, 
again, be a perfect correlation between income and housing quality, but now 
in such a way that a higher income is associated with a lower quality of 
the dwelling that will be occupied. 
If ds/dy is between zero and one, but not constant, the iron law may 
still be valid in special cases. But very different situations, in which it 
is hard to discover any relation between income and housing, may also 
occur. For instance it may happen that the iron law is reversed initially, 
but is valid for higher incomes, while ultimately it will be reversed 
again. 
9 Which distribution is equitable ? 
In the present section we will try to pursue the analysis of the 
preceding ones a little bit further by posing the question why governments 
undertake various measures in order to influence the allocation on the 
housing market. It has already been mentioned in the introduction that the 
Pareto-criterion will be of little help in this respect. 
A possible alternative is the utilitarian solution in which the sum of 
the individual Utilities is maximized. This approach has been used in the 
theory of optimal taxation (see Mirrlees [1971] and Atkinson and Stiglitz 
[1980, ch. 13, 14] for an overview). In the present partial model we do not 
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consider the relation between income generation and taxation, and this is 
doubtless one of the reasons of the irrealistic results. When the utility 
function is concave, which seems to be a normal requirement (especially 
when one adopts a carinal concept of utility), redistribution of utility 
from the wealthy to the less wealthy will always be beneficial. The 
implication is that prices are such that in the optimal situation the 
remaining differences in income are just sufficiënt to compensate for the 
unavoidable differences in housing quality. This implication does not seem 
to be realistic. 
We will adopt the theory of fairness as an alternative. This theory 
originates from Foley [1967] and has been developed by Kolm [1972] and 
Varian [1974]. For reviews we refer to Thomson and Varian [1985] and Baumol 
[1986] . 
The central concept in this theory of distributional justice is envy. A 
particular distribution of a given amount of commodities gives rise to envy 
when some of the people engaged in the distribution would prefer to have 
received the amount that others get to their own share. When the 
distribution concerns a homogeneous commodity, equal division is the only 
fair solution. When the commodity to be distributed is heterogeneous, other 
solutions than equal division may exist and be preferred to that one. There 
may be a best solution among a number of possible fair solutions. 
In the present situation we will regard the housing stock as the 
heterogeneous commodity that has to be distributed. Since housing is not 
only heterogeneous, but also indivisible, the problem cannot be solved by 
equal division. It is, in fact, easy to see that there will be no solution 
to our problem if we consider only the distribution of the housing stock. 
Since all consumers have the same tastes, those allocated to a dwelling of 
type 1 will be envied by all others. However, we have to be aware of the 
fact that not only housing itself, but also the costs associated with 
housing have to be distributed. If the households occupying a dweiling of a 
higher quality would have to pay a much larger share of these costs, they 
will probably no longer be envied.11 
Let us now reconsider the allocation at uniform prices. In equilibrium 
all households can make their utility maximizing choice out of the N 
combinations (w , p 1). The price should now be viewed as the share the 
n rn 
households pays in the total costs associated with housing. This 
28 
interpretation is facilitated by the fact that in equilibrium the budget 
condition of the government is exactly satisfied. We have to conclude 
therefore that the distribution of housing stock and housing costs that 
corresponds with uniform prices is fair, in the sense given to this term by 
Foley c.s. 
It should, of course, be realized that this fairness has a limited 
meaning. It is conditional upon the distribution of income, which is taken 
to be exogenously given. In the literature the term 'incremental fairness' 
is sometimes used to indicate the limited sense of the term in contexts 
such as the present one.12 We have reached the following conclusion : 
Proposition 3 The allocation at uniform prices is incrementally fair. 
The allocation at uniform prices turns out to be the only one that is 
incrementally fair. As soon as a tax is introduced which is income-
dependent, rich households will envy the lower total price of housing that 
poor households pay, although they do not envy the housing of the poor as 
such. When also a rent subsidy is introduced and the ' iron law' is 
violated, some households who are not subsidized will envy the better 
housing situation of some poorer households as well. Allocation by means of 
income prices will also always cause envy because of the lower housing 
costs of the poor and envy because of the better housing situatio as soon 
as the iron law is violated. It must be concluded therefore that the theory 
of (incremental) fairness is not of much help for the determination of an 
equitable allocation mechanism for the housing market. 
The foregoing suggests that the actual judgements about the desirability 
of policy measures that influence the housing market do not accept the 
income distribution as given. More useful criteria for judging housing 
market policy will probably have redistribution of income as an explicit 
goal. However, the incorporation of such a target introduces new problems, 
since income is redistributed by other government measures as well, and one 
would probably like to coordinate the various means of redistribution. The 
possible negative effects of such a redistribution should then also be 
taken into account. Partial models, such as the one developed in this 
paper, would then be inadequate. 
In actual policy-making, however, the housing market policy is usually 
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considered as a special area, which has no direct links with the departement 
of social affairs. The suggestion that this area should only be viewed as a 
specialized subfield of the broader area concemed will probably not be 
welcomed by politicians. One must therefore conclude that a welfare-
economie analysis of housing market policy measures is fraught with 
paradoxes, if not contradictions. The normative criteria that we possess do 
not support measures that introducé income-dependent prices as long as the 
income distribution is taken as given (incremental fairness), or support an 
extensive redistribution (utilitarianism). But if income redistribution is 
regarded as a major goal of housing market policy one must pose the 
question whether how such a policy should be coordinated with other 
measures intended to reach this goal and whether such a policy would 
provide a good means to pursue it. 
There may be another approach to analyze housing policy. Instead of a 
normative approach, one may adopt a positive one and ask whether the 
introduction of policy measures that influence the allocation on the 
housing market are attractive to introducé for politicians. A sceptical 
observer may remark that in political matters votes are the only thing that 
counts. Measures that redistribute income by taking from a relatively small 
number of rich and giving to a relatively large number of poor will 
therefore always be attractive, especially for politicians who recruit 
their voters from the relatively poor (see Aumann and Kurz [1977]). This 
vision has some attractive characteristics. It was no accident that the 
rent subsidy was introduced by the most left-wing government the 
Netherlands has ever experienced.13 However, it also has its clear 
limitations. For instance, it leads one to expect that, assuming democracy, 
a relatively unequal distribution of income would tend to be correlated 
with more measures intended to redistribute income than a relatively equal 
one, while reality suggests the exact opposite.14 Moreover, the opinion 
that the income distribution resulting from a free functioning of the 
markets forces needs correction is widespread in many countries and not 
confined to opportunistic politicians and poor households that envy rich 
ones. But this takes us back, once again, to the normative approach.15 
11 Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed the effects of a number of policy 
measures, intended to improve the allocation on the housing market, in a 
30 
simple model. This model can be viewed as a pure situation in which the 
relation between income distribution and allocation on the housing market 
can be studied. 
It has been shown that the 'iron law' is valid under uniform pricing when 
housing is a non-inferior commodity. When the costs of housing are financed 
partly by means of tax payments the allocation remains the same, although 
the distribution of the costs of housing changes somewhat. Introduction of 
rent-subsidy or income prices may cause violations of the iron law. 
However, it turns out to be hard to predict the exact pattern of the 
allocation implied by these alternative allocation mechanisms, except when 
housing is a luxury good. In that case the iron law will always be valid. 
It is hard to judge whether or not the introduction of allocation systems 
different from uniform prices results in an improvement of welfare. The 
conventional toolbox of welfare economics, including the theory of fairness 
which has been developed recently, does not contain instruments which are 
helpful in this respect. The vague notion that the income distribution is 
not what it should be and that therefore the same will be true for the 
distribution of the housing stock seems to be a weak basis for policy 
measures. It must be concluded therefore that the normative aspects, which 
are of utmost importance as a justification for these measures turn out to 
be hard to analyze. The positive analysis carried out in the preceding 
sections may nevertheless be useful in that it gives one the possibility to 
ask politicians whether this is what they had in mind. 
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Notes 
1 The concept of housing needs can perhaps be considered as analogous to 
that of poverty (see e.g. Hagenaars [1986]). 
2 The paradoxical aspects of this widely, if not universally, held opinion 
may be noticed : one can hardly imagine a society in which all men are 
equal and one can hardly give content to the concept of equality without 
reference to a society in which it should be used. 
3 See e.g. Sen [1987, pp.35-38] where the changes in the initial position 
that may be necessary to arrive at an optimal situation are compared 
with those realized after a revolution. 
4 I.e. preferences must be such that the occupation of two dwellings will 
always result in a lower utility than occupation of one dweiling. 
5 This assumption is equivalent with the requirement that u' should be 
increasing in w and x. It is simply a matter of convenience that it is 
introduced here in this alternative form. 
6 It should be noted that the possibility that this set is of positive 
measure situation cannot be excluded by simply assuming (as we have 
done) that the income distribution is such that the set of households 
earning an arbitrary income y is of measure zero. Tastes and the way 
prices depend on income can also be the cause of a situation in which 
the set of households being indifferent between two or more dwelling 
types has a positive measure. Such situations correspond with a 
violation of the continuity condition of of the demand functions, 
required in proposition 1. 
7 Assumption 6 can be rewritten (making use of eq. 4) as : 
32v 
3(y-p)2 
Pv ' 
3w3(y-p) 
It is common to assume (as has been done in assumption 3) that both 
3v/3w and 3v/3(y-p) are positive and that 32v/3(y-p)2 is negative. We 
can then be sure that assumption 2 is satisfied when 32v/3w3(y-p) < 0. 
It should be noted, however, that this is not a necessary, but only a 
3v 
3(y-p) 
3v 
3w 
> 
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sufficiënt condition. (It may be interpreted as saying that housing and 
income to be spent on other consumption goods are substitutes.) 
8 One may wonder whether this condition is also necessary. The answer is 
that in actual situations, with a limited number of existing dwelling 
types, it is not. It may then be the case that the condition is violated 
for many combinations of w and y-p and that the iron law, nevertheless, 
holds. However, if we wish to exclude the possibility that the iron law 
will be violated for any possible pair of dwellings, then the condition 
is also close to necessary. This can be seen by considering the 
situation in which the inequality in the condition is reversed for a 
measurable set of combinations of partial dwelling utilitities and 
incomes-net-of prices. It is then possible to find a combination (w, p) 
for which the iron law does not hold. 
9 One may wonder whether this definition corresponds with the usual notion 
of non-inferiority, viz. the requirement that the demand function is 
non-decreasing in income. It can be shown easily that in the case of 
two commodities the requirement that ds/dx.. >0, with s the slope of the 
indif f erence curve and x one of the two commodities, rules out the 
possibility that the other is inferior. In the general, n commodity, 
case, one may study the demand for good n by considering all other 
commodities as a composite good and it can be verified that the 
requirement 3s/dc > 0, where c is the composite good, rules out the 
possibility that x is inferior. The conjectured correspondence 
therefore exists. 
10 The actual subsidy that is used in the Netherlands is more complicated 
than the one presented here. There is a maximum amount of rent that can 
be subsidized and the fraction o„ rises with income. This makes it 
impossible that the subsidy is only beneficial to the rich. 
11 This procedure is analogous to the one proposed by Kolm [1972, pp. 
67-71] for fair division in the presence of indivisibilities in that the 
distribution of an indivisible good is made easier by considering it 
simultaneously with something perfectly divisble. In Kolm's case a 
positive amount of money, in our case the costs of housing. See also 
Crawford and Heller [1979], especially sections 1 and 2. 
12 We ignore here the problems that can be associated with the concept of 
incremental fairness, see Feldman and Kirman [1974]. 
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13 It should, however, be noted that an alternative function of this 
subsidy is to help households who are unable to find a dwelling with a 
reasonable rent on the heavily disequilibrated Dutch housing market. The 
model used here is of course unable to analyze the effectiveness of the 
measure in this respect. 
14 It may, however, be hard to determine which of the two related phenomena 
is the cause and which the effect. 
15 The foregoing suggests that opportunistic politicians support measures 
that redistribute incomes from rich to poor households and use the 
widespread value judgement concerning the equitable distribution of the 
housing market in order to increase the support for such measures. 
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Appendix Existence of equilibrium 
Al Two Lemma's 
We will first prove two characteristics of the market demand functions 
which will be of use for the existence proof that will be given later on : 
Lemma 1 The N dweiling types are weak gross substitutes when assumption 3 
is satisfied. 
Weak gross substitutability means that D will be a non-increasing function 
of its own price p and a non-decreasing function of all other prices p ,, 
n'^n. In the present context it can be interpreted as saying that demands 
D are non-increasing in w and non-decreasing inu ,, nVn. 
n ö n 6 n' 
Proof. Assume that w increases. Then the price p (y) increases and the 
utility v decreases. As a consequence, utility maximizing households who 
demanded a dwelling of type n before the price increase may decide to 
switch their demand to another type of dweiling. Households who originally 
demanded another type of dweiling will never decide to switch their demand 
to a dweiling of type n. 
The consequence of a decrease in w are opposite. D 
Two remarks are in order : 
1 Gross substitutability of the demand function is, in the present 
context, an almost immediate consequence of utility maximization. It has 
been derived for a similar model by Sweeney [1974]. 
2 Although it has been assumed that the indirect Utilities v are 
(strictly) increasing in income-net-of-housing-cost y-p , market demand 
cannot be shown to satisfy strong gross substitutability. The reason is 
that the effects of a change in a price p may be zero (when D equals 
either 0 or b) or may be limited to a small number of other demands only. 
A second property of aggregate demand that is very heplful for the 
existence proof is that D becomes close to (or equal to) zero for high 
values of u> and close to (or equal to) b for low (i.e. negative) values of 
this variable. This property is ensured by assumption 4 : 
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Lemma 2 When assumption 3 is satisfied and w , is fixed for all n V n 
n' 
lim D - 0, (Ala) 
u> -K» n n 
n=l...N, 
lim D = b, (Alb) 
co -*-«> n n 
n=l...N. 
The proof is obvious (use assumption 4). 
A third property of the demand functions that is useful for existence 
proofs is continuity in the allocation variables. In order to see whether 
this property can be guaranteed, we repeat the definition of market demand 
D n -b._J Sn(o>, y).f(y).dy, (A2) 
n-1...N. 
We know by assumption 4 that D will ultimately become equal to zero when 
co becomes infinitely large and will ultimately become equal to b when co 
becomes infinitely small. A necessary condition for continuity is that D 
should take on any value between these extremes for finite values of co . 
J
 n 
Assume that 0<D <b at some values of the allocation variables. It follows 
n 
that there should be some n', n'/n, for which the expression v -v , changes 
sign when income varies between y . and y . There exist specifications 
J m m -'max 
of v which do not satisfy this requirement under some allocation 
mechanisms. Continuity of the demand functions can therefore not be ensured 
in general. Since conditions that guarantee continuity vary with the 
prevailing allocation mechanism it is not useful to state them at the 
present level of generality. We will therefore first prove our general 
existence result, conditional upon continuity, and return to the question 
whether this property can be guaranteed under the various allocation 
mechanisms in the final section of this appendix. 
A2 Proof of proposition 1 
Before proving the proposition itself, we will first prove two additional 
lemma's : 
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Lemma 3 If the demand functions are continuous, there exists a vector of 
allocation variables for which demand equals supply for all dwelling 
types. This vector is unique up to the choice of a value of w for which 
p
N
( v w < ymin-
Proof. We start with fixing all allocation variables at an arbitrary value 
a> . Because of the existing hierarchy of dwelling types, all households 
will demand a dwelling of type 1. Now increase w.. , and therefore all prices 
p (w.. , y) , until the demand D1 becomes equal to supply. Assumption 3 and 
the continuity of the demand functions ensure that this is possible. 
In the sitution that results all households that do not demand a dwelling 
of type 1 demand one of type 2. Therefore the price p„ should be increaesed 
until this excess-demand is also removed. During this price increase care 
has to be taken that demand for dwellings of type 1 remains equal to 
supply; this can be done by further increases in the price p1 . 
This procedure can be continued until all excess demand is removed. The 
final situation is clearly a price equilibrium and has the price p equal 
to the value that has been chosen bef ore the start of the procedure. (A 
more formal description of such a price adjustment process in a general 
equilibrium context can be found in Van der Laan and Talman [1987].) 
To show the uniqueness, assume that there are multiple equilibria. Let 
w(l) and a>(2) be two such equilibria, with w„(l) - w (2). There should be 
at least one n for which u> (1) ^  w (2). Assume, without loss of generality, 
that w (1) < w (2) . Let A be the set of dwelling types n' with w , (1) < 
w ,(2) and let D =Y ,D , the total demand for dwelling types whose prices 
n' v ' A ^neA n' 6 JV r 
have increased. In both equilibria D should take on the same value. 
Now consider an individual who chooses a dwelling of type n' '€A in 
equilibrium 1. Such a household will certainly not choose a dwelling of a 
type n'eA in equilibrium 2. It follows that all households choosing of a 
dwelling type n'eA in equilibrium 1 should continue to choose for such a 
dwelling type in equilibrium 2. However, there must be at least one income 
level y, at which v ,(1) =v (1) for some n'eA and n€A. If the prices p ,, J
* n n n 
n'eA, increase and all other prices p ,n£A, decrease or remain the same, 
n 
v ,(2) < v (2). This implies that there must be some individuals who switch 
n n 
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from a dweiling of type n'eA to one of type nCA. But this contradicts our 
result that DA should be identical in both situations. D 
A 
Because of the uniqueness, we can write the equilibrium values of the 
allocation variables w , n=l,...,N-l, as functions of w and have : 
Lemma 4 : 
lim u> (w.T) = -co (A3) 
N 
n=l...N-l, 
Proof. Assume that the equilibrium value of u> may remain greater than some 
finite limit value, say w , if w -*•-». By assumption 4, v(w , y-p(w , y)) > 
lim _^  Cw„, y-p(w y)'), and this implies that dwellings of type n will 
N 
not be demanded in equilibria with a sufficiently small (negative) value of 
w„. Hence, we find a contradiction. 
N 
The opposite assumption can be shown to be contradictory in a completely 
analogous way. D 
We are now in a position to prove proposition 1 : 
Proposition 1 If assumptions 1-4 are fulfilled and the demand functions are 
continuous in the allocation variables, there exists an unique equilibrium. 
Proof It should be observed that the values of P that correspond with price 
equilibria can be viewed as a correspondence of u> . It follows from the 
lemma that these revenues become larger if w increases and will, by 
assuption 3, reach or exceed the value C for some finite value. 
Furthermore, it follows from lemma 4 that the revenues become infinitely 
small (i.e. negative) if w decreases without a lower bound. Inbetween 
there should be at least one value of w at which the budget can be 
balanced. 
Uniqueness follows from the fact that there is an unique price 
equilibrium for every value of w . D 
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A3 Continuity of the demand functions 
We now return to the question of continuity. The easiest case occurs when 
prices are uniform. For this case we have : 
Lemma 5 If assumption 6 is fulfilled, 
a) the demand functions are continuous when prices are uniform and also 
when rents are uniform and housing costs are partly financed by taxes, 
b) the demand functions are continuous when there is rent subsidy and 
ds/dj * a^.o~, possibly except for a set of measure zero, 
c) the demand functions are continuous hwen there are income prices and 
3s/3y *• 1, possibly except for a set of measure zero. 
Proof. A discontinu!ty in the total demand D implies that a small increase 
in the price p can give rise to a 'jump' in this demand. This can only 
occur if demand switches from n to (or from) some n' , on at least one 
interval [y',y''], y''>y'. This implies that for incomes in this interval, 
the trade-off between dwelling Utilities w and w , and incomes-net-of-
° n n' 
housing-costs y-p and y-p , is exactly the same. But under uniform prices 
or uniform rents this can never occur when 3s/3y>0 everywhere, as stated in 
assumption 6. We have therefore found a contradiction. 
When there is a rent subsidy, the trade of between quality and price of 
two dwelling types can be exactly the same for all incomes on a non-trivial 
interval if one dwelling type is subsidized and the other is not and 3s/3y 
= (71 .cr„ on that interval. It follows from assumption 6 that there cannot be 
a constant trade-off for two dwelling types which are both subsidized or 
none of which is subsidized. 
When there are income prices, the trade-off between price and quality of 
two dwelling types can only be constant if the household is willing to 
offer a given fraction of its income for a given increase in quality, i.e. 
if 3s/3y =1 on a non-trivial interval. D 
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